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Conceptualizing Resistance in Post-Conflict Environments* 
 
Abstract: While recent efforts to analyse resistance to post-conflict interventions 
have led to important insights into the nature of contemporary peacebuilding efforts, 
their failure to adequately problematize the concept of resistance itself and to adapt it 
to the specific realities of post-conflict neoliberalism has proven to be problematic. 
This article explores the internal tensions and inconsistencies that define the concept 
of resistance in post-conflict environments, focusing specifically on five topics: the 
interaction of structure and agency, the presence of intent, the role of power, the 
nature of markets and the possibility of emancipation. Key problems are highlighted, 
and, where possible, potential solutions are proposed. The issues raised by this article 
demand immediate attention if the conceptual viability and analytical value of 
resistance is to be maintained in post-conflict contexts. 
 
Keywords: Resistance; Peacebuilding; Neoliberalism; Liberal Peace 
 
The dominance of neoliberal1 economic orthodoxy in post-conflict peacebuilding 
programs is widely acknowledged. So, too, are its effects. Common reforms—including trade 
and investment liberalization, the deregulation of labour and financial markets, the privatization 
of state assets and reductions in public spending—threaten the establishment of peace while 
undermining growth, worsening inequalities, removing social protections and increasing poverty. 
The universalist pretences of neoliberalism render it insensitive to context and popular opinion, 
causing it to view the issues confronting post-conflict societies as solvable through a standard set 
of technocratic reforms.2 For societies emerging from conflict, such ideological blindness can 
prove costly. 
Despite these failures, questions of how, why and by whom this neoliberal orthodoxy is 
contested have only recently attracted scholarly attention. While such work has performed the 
valuable task of balancing neoliberal triumphalism with commonly marginalized perspectives 
and experiences, it nevertheless possesses significant limitations. In particular, the failure to 
adequately problematize the concept of resistance itself threatens its conceptual coherence and, 
in some cases, results in the adoption of problematic theoretical positions that are internally 
inconsistent. A more complete exploration of the concept of resistance not only reveals these 
internal inconsistencies, but also points to special considerations that arise in post-conflict 
environments. To be of any use in analysing the nature of post-conflict neoliberalism, the 
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concept of resistance must be critically engaged with and adapted to fit its specific context. This 
article is dedicated to taking early steps in this fruitful direction. 
The remainder of this article is divided into two sections. The first offers a brief overview 
of the relevant literature on resistance, both in post-conflict contexts and to neoliberalism more 
generally. It acknowledges the value of this considerable body of work and the important 
insights that it is able to provide. Still, if the concept of resistance is to be of use for 
understanding contemporary peacebuilding processes, it must be suited to the realities of post-
conflict environments and rid of its major internal tensions and inconsistencies. The second 
section of this article therefore explores major points of contention that define the existing 
literature while suggesting possible ways to overcome unresolved impasses. Five issues are 
particularly highlighted: the way resistance is shaped by the interaction of structure and agency, 
the role that intent plays in resistance, the nature of power, the understanding of markets and the 
possibility of emancipation. Each is fundamental to understanding resistance, both in post-
conflict environments and more generally. All must be addressed if the concept of resistance is to 
have any theoretical or empirical value.  
This article can be read within the vein of the ‘secondary critique’3 in current 
peacebuilding literature, as while it accepts many of the arguments put forward by critics of the 
‘liberal peace’ framework and recognizes the important contributions that these have made to 
understanding contemporary peace processes, it also holds that this critical literature itself has 
significant shortcomings. Problematizing resistance provides an excellent lens through which to 
view some of these broader failings, making the arguments presented here relevant to 
contemporary peacebuilding debates more generally.  
 
I. Theorizing Resistance 
Analysing the role of resistance in post-conflict environments is a relatively recent 
scholarly undertaking. Oliver Richmond’s exploration of emancipatory forms of peacebuilding 
that are located at what he terms the ‘local-local’ level, which exists beyond the scope of liberal 
conceptions of society and politics, is a particularly notable example of this trend. For 
Richmond, subjugated knowledges, epistemologies, ontologies and perspectives that are 
marginalized by power, but nevertheless remain able to reformulate political realities through the 
empowerment of disparate and silenced critical agencies, involve everyday forms of resistance 
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that fundamentally undermine, and expose the weaknesses of, the local applications of power 
that characterize peacebuilding, providing space for a ‘post-liberal’ peace based on context, 
subjectivity, consensus and individual understandings of justice, welfare, rights and political 
organization.4 Roger Mac Ginty’s work is also relevant, particularly its recognition of the role 
that resistance plays in a complex web of international compliance methods and co-operation 
incentives, along with local subversion, co-option, non-compliance and alternatives to the 
‘liberal peace’, that shapes the fundamental hybridity of contemporary peace operations.5 While 
Richmond and Mac Ginty adopt a broad approach to post-conflict resistance, other authors, such 
as Mark Duffield6 and Michael Pugh,7 more specifically locate resistance in (post-)conflict 
political economies that violate the tenets of the neoliberal international system and are more 
appropriately suited to local realities. For Pugh, as international actors disavow their governing 
functions, they create a lack of stability in which the subaltern is given space for agency and 
resistance, and this often takes the form of the informal and illicit activities that thrive in the 
absence of essential employment and welfare programs.8 Such work reflects broader trends in 
current peacebuilding literature. Critical approaches to the liberal peace have long turned to ‘the 
local’ in search of alternatives to flawed contemporary orthodoxy, and a number of scholars have 
examined the perspectives of local populations, highlighting the disconnect between these and 
the policies implemented by international actors9 as well as the ‘frictions’ that peacebuilding 
interactions entail.10 The normative goal of emancipation underlines all of these endeavours; the 
study of resistance, insofar as it is able to cast light on how emancipation is strived for or what it 
might entail, is seen as a valuable line of critical enquiry.  
Recent work on post-conflict resistance can be usefully situated within the broader field 
of literature surrounding resistance to neoliberalism more generally. A number of theoretical 
trends can be identified here: neo-Gramscian analyses that aim to outline the contours of existing 
counter-hegemonic forces that can contest and provide alternatives to the cultural hegemony of 
the transnational capitalist class;11 critical theory approaches that attempt to problematize the 
assumptions that define globalization and highlight the historical, social and political 
situatedness of its theories and knowledges for the purposes of transformation;12 postcolonial 
theories that aim to (re)politicize and (re)historicize neoliberal globalization, emphasizing the 
inseparability of economic and cultural domination while acknowledging the importance of 
individual agencies for providing alternatives to the fundamental incompleteness of its 
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universalist logics;13 and feminist analyses that frame globalization in a gendered context and 
reveal the relationship that its functions have for perpetuating and spreading oppressive 
patriarchal hierarchies.14 These forms of resistance are commonly framed in terms of a broad-
based ‘globalization-from-below’ that is sensitive to cultural diversity and a variety of social, 
economic and environmental issues, contesting neoliberal ‘globalization-from-above’ by 
providing alternatives to its failings.15 Karl Polanyi’s description of countermovements,16 Michel 
Foucault’s theories of biopower and governmentality, ‘subjugated knowledges’, ‘tactical 
reversal’, the ‘aesthetics of existence’, ‘self-care’ and ‘technologies of the self’,17 and James C. 
Scott’s emphasis on everyday forms of resistance18 are also useful for conceptualizing resistance 
to neoliberalism, and inform much of the broader literature on the topic. Resistance to 
neoliberalism is not a new concept, and it is important that analyses of how it occurs in post-
conflict contexts do not treat it as such. 
It is impossible to do justice to this broad field of literature in such a brief survey. Still, 
the purpose here is to highlight how the concept of resistance has been adopted by critical 
peacebuilding literature and how the project of exploring resistance to post-conflict 
neoliberalism fits into understandings of resistance to neoliberalism more generally. As 
evidenced, the concept of resistance is informed by a diversity of theoretical approaches, and 
these, from one perspective, contribute to its richness, complexity and flexibility. From a 
different perspective, however, and one that this emphasized here, this diversity threatens the 
coherence and usefulness of resistance as a concept, and therefore demands further scrutiny. The 
remainder of this article is dedicated to such a task. 
 
II. Unresolved Issues 
It would be intellectually problematic to assume that it is possible to combine a diverse 
collection of approaches to resistance without encountering notable points of theoretical 
contention. Like both neoliberalism and peacebuilding,19 the concept of resistance is not without 
its own internal conflicts and inconsistencies, while a notable lack of consensus exists 
surrounding several major conceptual points and, more fundamentally, underlying theoretical 
and epistemological questions. Considering these in a post-conflict context raises further 
difficulties. Five issues are particularly central here: the interaction of structure and agency, the 
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presence of intent, the role of power, the nature of markets and the possibility of emancipation. 
Each is considered in turn. 
 
i. The interaction of structure and agency 
The first major issue raised by the theoretical literature is the extent to which resistance is 
shaped by the interaction of structure and agency. Local agency is, of course, a central focus of 
critical peacebuilding literature, and is rightly viewed as a good that should be maximized by 
peacebuilding processes. The extent to which local agency can inform resistance, however, is 
unclear.  
Scott and Gramsci offer particularly divergent perspectives on this topic: whereas 
Gramsci claims that the consciousness of the oppressed is dominated by a form of hegemony that 
renders them unable to recognize the revolutionary potential of their actions, Scott contends that 
hegemony involves little ideational permeation, with action constrained by power to a far more 
significant extent than thought. Scott’s work therefore rejects accounts that neglect human 
agency in favour of structural factors, emphasizing the range of action and potential for self-
definition—even if shaped, importantly, by economic and other circumstances—that all subjects 
of analysis possess.20 Discounting the importance of structure, however, is intellectually 
hazardous as it effectively defers to a central tenet of neoliberalism: that human beings are free 
from socioeconomic constraints to pursue independent action in accordance with their interests.21 
Structural factors are particularly important in post-conflict environments, as conflict, while not 
entirely limiting the possibility for agency,22 entails dramatic structural transformations of 
everything from individual livelihoods to the legal, institutional and regulatory apparatuses of the 
state. Agency is forced to operate within these structural constraints, and is severely limited by, 
for example, the forced adoption of survival strategies or coping mechanisms. Resistance may 
still be possible in such circumstances, but it is important not to romanticize its potential. 
The interaction of structure and agency points to a more problematic issue that exists at 
the heart of critical peacebuilding literature as a whole: the dichotomization of ‘the international’ 
and ‘the local’ as distinct categories of analysis. The complexities of identity and the profusion 
of international linkages in (post-)conflict environments and beyond means that these categories 
are less discreet than is often suggested, and that the line that divides them constantly fluctuates 
through processes of negotiation and imposition. Attempts to maintain an international/local 
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dichotomy can replicate the essentialism inherent in the (neo)liberal accounts that critical 
literature seeks to oppose, circumscribing and characterizing ‘the local’ as a site of resistance 
that is separate from the power of ‘the international’. It is true that the concept of hybridity 
acknowledges the interaction and mutual influence of ‘the local’ and ‘the international’, and is 
employed to analyze how the two combine and coexist in specific contexts. In doing so, 
however, it still relies on the separation of ‘the local’ and ‘the international’ as distinct categories 
that precede hybridization, partially reaffirming, rather than escaping, their problematic 
dichotomization.23  
The presence of agency, furthermore, many be a necessary cause for resistance, but it is 
not a sufficient one. Scott’s theorization of how resistance can exist in spite of domination should 
not be extrapolated to the Foucauldian notion that resistance is necessarily present wherever 
power exists,24 as such a claim could only be sustained through detailed empirical work 
documenting individual instances of resistance to power in all of its forms and possibly risks 
underestimating its coercive and co-optive capabilities. Again, this also risks adopting a core 
feature of the neoliberal understanding of agency: the assumption that, because power structures 
exist, they are necessarily resisted by those who encounter them, which depoliticizes the subjects 
of analysis by replacing a meaningful definition of agency with ideologically driven 
determinism. It is thus more appropriate to understand power as creating the potential for 
resistance wherever the former remains incomplete; agency is necessary for this potential to be 
realized, but agency must by definition involve the ability to navigate power as one sees fit. This, 
of course, will not always be possible, but in such cases, agency—and therefore resistance—
cannot be said to exist.   
 
ii. The issue of intent 
The issue of intent involves two separate considerations: whether or not the intent of a 
person’s actions, regardless of their consequences, can sufficiently constitute resistance, and 
whether or not the consequences of a person’s actions, regardless of their intent, can do the same. 
Agency is central in the case of the former, as a person’s conscious decision to resist must be 
assigned due significance independently of the ‘success’ of any actions inspired by this decision. 
In many instances, power may be so pervasive, adaptive and durable that attempts at resisting its 
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application will experience little success. Such an attempt, though, is a form of resistance in 
itself, and merits due recognition. 
The role of agency in the latter, however, is more difficult to discern. This is primarily 
because of the fundamental complexity of the nature of intent. For example, actions that are 
commonly seen to fall into this category, such as theft or violence against an official, can be 
understood in two ways: in terms of their immediate benefits (or even non-rational causes), that 
is, the procurement of stolen goods or preventing what is seen as an abuse of authority; and in 
terms of what can be seen as their broader targets, such as established systems of economic 
distribution or political oppression. This second interpretation is especially significant for 
understanding resistance, as abstract concepts are commonly experienced in terms of their 
individual manifestations rather than as the sum of their parts, and are hence resisted as such. 
This is not to imply, of course, that all such actions can be understood in such a way, nor is it to 
justify those that can; instead, it is to acknowledge the complexities of understanding resistance 
as a phenomenon that is subject to the intricacies of human behaviour.25  
The issue of intent thus raises complicated epistemological and methodological questions 
surrounding the authority of an observer to (re)inscribe an action with meaning. Do scholars 
have the ability to signify observed actions as resistance? How does this authority relate to the 
significance ascribed to an action by the person(s) undertaking it? And to what extent can the 
immediate benefits of resistance be extrapolated to broader targets that the person(s) involved 
may not have considered? The ability to ‘speak’ for groups who are marginalized and/or 
oppressed by systems of power has been debated extensively,26 and such questions should not be 
absent from discussions about resistance, whether in post-conflict environments or elsewhere. 
Resistance is not a neutral concept that can be objectively witnessed; intent, like agency, is 
central to its presence, and neither can be separated from the complexities of individual 
experience. Carefully documenting the nature of these experiences is one of the primary tasks of 
the researcher, who must always be aware of the inherent limitations of such an undertaking.  
 
iii. The role of power 
As power is the ultimate target of resistance, it is essential for any understanding of 
resistance to be informed by a complementary approach to power. While the role of power in 
both peacebuilding and neoliberalism is commonly highlighted, the way in which this power is 
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conceptualized is not entirely consistent. It is possible to identify a number of different 
approaches to power within the existing literature on peacebuilding, with the work of, for 
example, Foucault,27 Gramsci,28 Scott29 and post-colonial theorists30 all serving as common 
reference points for critical scholarship. Such approaches, however, are not necessarily 
complimentary. The above discussion of the interaction of structure and agency highlights a 
significant point of contention, and is related to a broader issue about power as, on the one hand, 
a productive force that is exercised through dominant discourses, ideologies and systems of 
knowledge, and, on the other, a negative force that limits the scope of action through the use of 
coercive measures or social, economic and political stratification.31 There is also a lack of 
consensus surrounding the relationships that power involves, with the view that these are diffuse 
and fluid contrasting with more binary, hierarchical understandings.32 Attempting to reconcile 
disparate theories of power has notable limitations, and if these are exceeded without adequate 
explanation, the conceptual viability and coherence of resistance is threatened. 
Points of contention between these approaches to power do not present the only 
conceptual problem for critical peacebuilding literature. Significant problems also surround their 
use individually, the most notable of which concerns their applicability to the contemporary 
international system. While Scott’s work and post-colonial theory seem applicable to 
international attempts to introduce neoliberal reforms in peripheral global spaces, the same is not 
necessarily true for the understandings of power presented by Foucault and Gramsci, neither of 
whom wrote about power at an international level but rather derived their respective theoretical 
insights from specific, and overwhelmingly European, historically situated structures and 
processes. Decontextualizing and dehistoricizing their arguments to provide insights into 
phenomena that they never themselves commented on is not without its dangers, and the 
limitations that such efforts entail deserve further commentary in critical peacebuilding 
literature.33 Some scholars have further questioned the use of Foucault’s work for analyzing such 
topics as power and contemporary neoliberalism; it has been argued, for example, that Foucault 
viewed economic liberalism as coherent with his anti-humanism, and therefore endorsed it for 
the brief period during which his related Collège de France lectures took place,34 and that 
Foucauldian ‘technologies of the self’ have an ambiguous relationship with his understanding of 
technologies of power and cannot be understood in terms of resistance.35 There is, obviously, a 
considerable amount of literature that implicitly rejects such criticisms, but still, they underscore 
9 
 
 
the importance of problematizing widely held understandings of power and resistance before 
applying them in critical endeavours. 
This understanding of power must also be specific to the post-conflict contexts that it is 
used to analyse. Most contemporary theorizations of power were not designed to suit such 
circumstances, raising fundamental questions about their applicability to situations with 
drastically different social, political and economic realities—including varying levels of state 
legitimacy and capacity, social cohesion and international intervention, along with the possibility 
of alternative governance structures and forms of accumulation, dispossession and distribution 
that arose from conflict—than modern European states and societies. It is even difficult to argue 
that power takes the same form in such different (post-)conflict settings as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the international community is seeking to (re)integrate a middle-income, 
formerly authoritarian state into Europe’s ‘core’ from its ‘periphery’, establishing conditions for 
the abuse of public office though a lack of legitimacy, poorly designed political structures and 
economic liberalization efforts;36 Afghanistan, where a highly militarized intervention influences 
and interacts with a decentralized conflict economy with regional dimensions in a weak state 
with high levels of poverty;37 and Angola, where the state directs reconstruction efforts along 
lines that violate international orthodoxy.38 Power, like resistance, takes many forms. It must be 
studied in its specific contexts and manifestations. 
This emphasis on context does not prevent some general characteristics of power in 
contemporary peacebuilding projects from being outlined. As is widely acknowledged, power in 
such an environment can have several different loci, including the peacebuilding and 
development community itself, the state and non-state armed groups, traditional authority 
figures, the market, legal structures and social hierarchies and norms. Each of these can involve 
their own forms of co-option and coercion. Critical peacebuilding literature has done an excellent 
job at exploring these forms of power and their problematic implications.  
Power is not merely confined to formal channels, however, but is also a characteristic of 
informal forms of governance and economic activity that are often pervasive in (post-)conflict 
contexts.39 The existence of these informal power structures complicates distinctions between 
power and resistance, because while they are often sites of resistance to external intervention, 
they are nevertheless characterized by hierarchies and forms of exclusion that can be tied to 
neoliberalism itself. Informal/shadow economies are an excellent example of this, as while they 
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are often seen as major impediments to peacebuilding efforts,40 they rely on international 
markets, are shaped by global capital flows and divisions of labour, are often seen, in their more 
benign form, as a form of ‘local neoliberalism’ and are (re)produced by economic 
liberalization.41 These ambiguities raise two important points about the nature of power. First, 
international/local dichotomies are as inappropriate for understanding power in post-conflict 
environments as they are for understanding peacebuilding more generally. Informal/shadow 
economies are at once ‘local’ and ‘international’, with neither dimension fully comprehensible 
without the other. Second, there is no a priori distinction between the actors and methods 
involved in resistance and those involved in power. What serves as a form of resistance for some 
may—and commonly will—act as a form of power for others. Resistance often adopts the 
techniques and structures of power, blurring the lines between the two and rendering distinctions 
between them subjective.  
A viable theorization of resistance requires a similarly coherent and workable 
understanding of power. Critical literature has done a commendable job exploring the myriad 
ways in which power can become manifest in post-conflict environments, but important issues 
still need to be addressed before this work can provide a solid conceptual foundation for 
resistance. 
 
iv. The nature of markets 
Markets lie at the heart of the neoliberal project. For their proponents, markets possess a 
dual normative value by promoting both individual freedom and economic growth.42 In post-
conflict contexts, of course, they are also assigned the normative function of promoting peace, 
and are seen as intrinsically connected to individual rights, democracy and the rule of law.43 
Critical approaches to peacebuilding have long questioned the desirability of market reforms in 
the aftermath of conflict, and, in the process, have usefully examined alternative local economic 
arrangements that coexist and interact with the formal economic power structures that define 
neoliberalism.44 The problem, however, is that the critical literature lacks a coherent theoretical 
understanding of markets, and much of it fails to free itself from key neoliberal assumptions.45 
Literature on resistance that addresses the nature of markets further complicates this picture, and 
can be subjected to the same criticisms. Such a failing presents significant conceptual limitations 
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for understanding resistance to neoliberalism, both in post-conflict environments and more 
generally. 
Two issues are particularly important in this regard. The first concerns the ontological 
status of markets. Specifically, framing neoliberal economic reforms solely in terms of 
deregulation, privatization, marketization and the large-scale curtailment of the economic 
functions of the state clashes with the Polanyian understanding of markets as politically 
constructed through the artificial separation of economic systems and structures from their social 
roots. Markets are not merely natural, universal phenomena that are uncovered by the retreat of 
the state; rather, they are profoundly shaped by—and wholly rooted in—their specific historical, 
social and political circumstances, and are actively produced and maintained by large-scale state 
intervention that ensures their function. Neoliberalism does not, as is often assumed, involve the 
surrender of state power to the mechanisms of an abstract system of production and exchange 
based on the interaction of supply and demand, but is instead characterized by the dramatic 
redeployment of state power around a regime of private accumulation, dispossession and 
distribution.46 Critical approaches that dichotomize ‘the market’ with ‘the state’ therefore risk 
separating and reifying both concepts while removing them from specific contextual 
circumstances, and furthermore fail to challenge the principle that an apolitical, ahistorical ‘free 
market’ both exists and is what externally driven post-conflict reconstruction efforts seek, 
however successfully, to implement.47 This is not to repeat the argument that contemporary 
peacebuilding processes do not in fact have significant (neo)liberal underpinnings,48 but rather to 
argue that a significant distinction must be made between neoliberalism in its actual and 
idealized forms, and that the ‘free market’ exists solely in the latter.49 Ignoring such a distinction 
involves implicitly accepting a highly ideological neoliberal market ontology, and is a major 
conceptual shortcoming. 
The ontology of markets is particularly significant in post-conflict environments. Conflict 
has transformative effects on local, national, regional and even international economies, and 
these do not simply vanish with the official cessation of hostilities.50 While markets should not 
be seen as natural phenomena that are merely uncovered through institutional and legal reforms, 
it is also important to avoid the idea that markets are constructed ex nihilo in post-conflict 
environments through neoliberal interventionism; instead, the constructive dimensions of post-
conflict neoliberalism interact with existing economic realities shaped by the political economy 
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of the preceding conflict. Critical literature has certainly not neglected the political economy of 
conflict, and several studies have provided valuable empirical insights into how (post-)conflict 
economies function in particular cases.51 Still, as stated above, more focus should be given to 
how power and resistance interact in informal/shadow economies, with a special attention to how 
the economic processes and structures that emerge during conflict, as well as those that predated 
the conflict itself, are tied to broader aspects of global neoliberalism. The concept of hybridity is 
useful here, but, again, the international/local axis that it depends upon is problematic, and the 
power structures, hierarchies and forms of exclusion that characterize local political economies, 
many of which will indeed be shaped by neoliberalism, merit further exploration. All markets are 
constructed, and conflict has historically served as a prominent catalyst for their emergence and 
definition.52 ‘The local’ is not immune to these forces, and enquiring into how it is shaped by 
them in various specific contexts provides a promising route to a market ontology that theories of 
resistance can be adequately grounded in. 
The second important issue is the role that knowledge plays in markets. From the 
‘economic calculation problem’53 to the notion of rational expectations54 and the efficient-market 
hypothesis,55 the idea that markets can aggregate, process and distribute information more 
effectively than any other form of social, political and economic organization is a central 
component of neoclassical economics.56 Recognition of the extent to which knowledge is seen as 
a fundamental component of market activity by neoliberal epistemology, and the significance of 
this as an underlying assumption of the economic models that rationalize and legitimize 
neoliberalism as a desirable political and socioeconomic system, is largely absent within critical 
literature. Indeed, this understanding of markets is not only largely unquestioned in critical 
approaches to neoliberalism, but adopted by them as well. Foucault’s work is the most 
significant in this regard, as the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and governmentality both 
assume that markets function as they do according to idealized neoliberalism: as a medium for 
the efficient transmission and allocation of knowledge. For Foucault, of course, this view of 
markets is relevant not for distributive efficiency, but because of how the supposed impossibility 
of centralized state control over the complexities of a system dominated by rational economic 
actors historically resulted in new technologies of power to influence the characteristics of 
populations and regulate individual behaviour. It is the role of knowledge in markets, for 
Foucault, that presents the central problem from which the production and government of the 
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economic subject—homo economicus—emerges.57 Accepting the neoliberal view of knowledge 
in markets severely circumscribes critiques of neoliberalism as a whole.58 This is a major 
problem that critical literature must seek to overcome.   
How, then, should markets be understood? Such a question is obviously difficult to 
answer, so it is perhaps understandable that the critical literature can be silent or internally 
contradictory on fundamental issues. Based on the critiques presented here, however, a few basic 
principles can nevertheless be outlined. First, all markets are constructed, and must be 
understood in terms of both the forms of power they involve and the specific historical, social 
and political conditions in which they emerge and evolve. In post-conflict environments, these 
conditions will be significantly influenced by violent forms of accumulation, dispossession and 
distribution that (re)insert conflict zones into national, regional and international economic 
systems, and that are themselves tied to the dynamics of global neoliberalism. Much of the 
critical literature has done an excellent job demonstrating this point.59 Second, the state and the 
market do not exist in competition where the expansion of one involves the retreat of the other. 
Instead, they are rather mutually constitutive. Neoliberal markets depend on the state to function, 
and are supported by the refashioning of state power to serve such a purpose. In contemporary 
peace missions, the role of the state in this regard is often filled by international actors who 
oversee neoliberal reforms. Third, the disciplinary power of markets should not be overstated, or 
should be theoretically grounded in a way that questions the neoliberal understanding of the role 
of knowledge in markets. Interrogating the forms of power that markets involve and facilitate is 
of course an essential task, but it should not be done so in a way that reinforces the intellectual 
underpinnings of the system of power itself.  
Until such issues surrounding the nature of markets are resolved, conceptualizing 
resistance to neoliberalism will be a difficult task. 
 
v. Emancipation  
Critical analyses of peacebuilding60 and neoliberal globalization61 commonly assume that 
resistance possesses significant emancipatory potential. This, however, is not necessarily true. 
Even if one accepts the international/local dichotomy around which the contestation of 
neoliberalism is often framed, there are major practical and conceptual difficulties in viewing a 
disparate collection of specific movements and moments as representative of a form of unified 
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global agency that possesses the potential to transform the political economy of the international 
system.62 While it is true, as argued above, that ambiguities arise from the fact that power is 
frequently experienced in its individual manifestations rather than as a coherent whole, it is too 
large a conceptual leap to equate opposition to a particular manifestation of power with a 
complete rejection of power in all of its forms, let alone a broader consensus on how an 
emancipatory social, political and economic order would or should be structured. Of course, 
much of the critical literature on peacebuilding and neoliberalism—particularly the former—
emphasizes subjectivity and contextual specificity over larger (pseudo-)Marxist narratives, but 
such a change of focus does not necessarily strengthen the case for emancipation. There are two 
reasons for this. First, such an approach risks idealizing ‘the local’ as a site of resistance, failing 
to recognize, as argued above, the existence of local power structures as well as the fundamental 
subjectivity and interconnectedness of power and resistance. Eliminating all problematic forms 
of power from a post-conflict environment requires more than altering or extricating ‘the 
international’; it can involve fundamental changes to ‘the local’ itself. Transforming local power 
structures will likely have a certain amount of support within the local population, but could also 
face stern resistance from those who benefit from their existence. Recognizing these divisions 
and the hierarchies and interests they reflect is crucial for (re)politicizing the subjects of 
peacebuilding interventions, and doing so significantly complicates understandings of 
emancipation. 
Second, the theoretical understandings of resistance commonly employed in such a task 
are often at odds with emancipatory goals. The prominence of Foucault in contemporary 
understandings of resistance is particularly noteworthy here, as not only does Foucault’s anti-
humanism render any positive claims about the nature of emancipation problematic, but Foucault 
himself was, at best, ambiguous about the emancipatory potential of resistance, suggesting that it 
is often co-opted in a way that masks domination.63 Polayni, whose work features less in the 
critical literature on peacebuilding than it does in the literature on resistance more generally, 
similarly does not point to emancipation as an outcome of resistance, but rather a situation in 
which the effort to implement economic liberalization is met by and coexists with oppositional 
efforts to re-embed economic activity in its traditional social roots.64 If critical approaches to 
peacebuilding seek to employ the concept of resistance in service of emancipatory goals, they 
must look elsewhere for a theoretical approach that understands resistance in such terms.  
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It is not only the relationship between emancipation and resistance that is problematic; 
the concept of emancipation itself suffers from a lack of normative and definitional clarity. The 
desire to refrain from prescriptive accounts of emancipation is understandable given the 
commitment to respecting context, local ownership and particular understandings of peace and 
justice that much of the critical literature adheres to. The problem, however, is that doing so fails 
to elaborate on exactly what emancipation might entail beyond a vague set of principles that can 
be rooted in Eurocentric understandings of rights and state/society relations.65 Does 
emancipation merely mean trading one external social, economic and political model—
neoliberalism—for another? What if local understandings of emancipation lack the commitment 
to individual rights, justice and freedoms that are often at the heart of critical approaches to 
neoliberalism? In short, will ‘local’ systems, processes and arrangements only be considered 
emancipatory if the outcomes they produce are judged as such according to distinctly non-‘local’ 
criteria? All of this, again, assumes that a ‘local’ understanding of emancipation, even in a single 
context, can be said to exist in the first place, and that competing interests and worldviews within 
‘the local’ do not prevent coherent and shared understandings of emancipation from emerging at 
all. This is a significant assumption, and one that should not be taken for granted. 
Studies of resistance must either delink the concept from emancipation or provide a 
specific theoretical justification for how it can be emancipatory. The conceptual leap from 
resistance to emancipation is too significant to simply be assumed, and where such a connection 
cannot be demonstrated, it must be abandoned.  
 
III. Conclusions 
The concept of resistance has significant potential to provide valuable insights into the 
nature of contemporary peacebuilding processes, particularly given the extent to which the 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy that dominates these has proven to be so unsuitable for post-
conflict environments. If it is to do so, it needs to establish a certain degree of theoretical and 
empirical clarity. This article has sought to contribute to such a task by critiquing how resistance 
is employed to analyse the post-conflict environments, arguing that it is conceptually dangerous 
to combine a broad range of theoretical approaches to understand resistance without 
acknowledging the points of contention that inevitably arise from such a process. The interaction 
of structure and agency, the presence of intent, the role of power, the nature of markets and the 
16 
 
 
possibility of emancipation are all issues that lack consensus or remain unaddressed in existing 
approaches to resistance, particularly in post-conflict contexts, but that are nevertheless central to 
maintaining the coherence and usefulness of resistance and an analytical concept. This article has 
proposed tentative resolutions to each of these issues, but the divergences in the existing 
literature remain. Resistance, like any intellectual concept, must only be employed with due 
critical self-reflection. Anything less threatens to condemn it to irrelevance. 
If resistance is to be maintained as a useful concept for analysing post-conflict 
environments, theoretical work such as this must be complemented by detailed empirical analysis 
that focuses on its specific interactions with power in a wide variety of contexts. Given the 
failures of the neoliberal economic orthodoxy that dominates peacebuilding, the potential value 
of this line of research should not be underestimated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
                                                          
1 The term ‘liberal’ is often employed to describe the reforms implemented in post-conflict environments. 
‘Neoliberal’, however, is perhaps more appropriate term because it more accurately captures the highly 
interventionist and disciplinary nature of the political, social and economic reforms being implemented. The latter 
term is thus employed in this article unless works that are being referenced instead use the former.   
2 For a brief introduction to these criticisms, see: Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The 
Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed Books, 2001; and Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace 
after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
3 This term is used in Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ 
Cooperation and Conflict (forthcoming).  
4 Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. 
5 Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid forms of Peace, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
6 Duffield (see n.2 above). 
7 Michael Pugh, ‘Local Agency and Political Economies of Peacebuilding’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
Vol.11, No.2, 2011, pp.308-320; and Michael Pugh, ‘Reflections on Aggressive Peace’, International Peacekeeping, 
Vol.19, No.4, 2012, pp.410-425. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See, in particular, Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, London, 
Hurst & Co., 2006. 
10 See, for example, Special Issue, ‘Frictions in Peacebuilding Interventions: The Unpredictability of Local-Global 
Interaction’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.20, No.2, 2013. 
11 See, for example: Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Abingdon: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003; and Stephen Gill, ‘Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of 
Globalisation’, Millennium—Journal of International Studies, Vol.29, No.1, 2000, pp.131-140. Also see Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
12 See, for example: Catherine Eschle and Brice Maiguascha (eds.), Critical Theory, International Relations and ‘the 
Anti-Globalisation Movement’: The Politics of Global Resistance, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005; and Patrick Hayden 
and Chamsy el-Ojeili (eds.), Confronting Globalization: Humanity, Justice and the Renewal of Politics, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
13 See, for example: Sankaran Krishna, Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the 
Twenty-First Century, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009; and Amy Skonieczny, ‘Interrupting 
Inevitability: Globalization and Resistance’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol.35, No.1, 2010, pp.1-28. 
14 See, for example, Mary E. Hawkesworth, Globalization & Feminist Activism, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2006. 
15 This follows Richard Falk, ‘Resisting ‘Globalization-from-Above’ through ‘Globalization-from-Below’’, in Barry 
K. Gills (ed.), Globalization and the Politics of Resistance, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, pp.46-56. Also see: 
Louise Amoore (ed.), The Global Resistance Reader, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005; Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello 
and Brendan Smith, Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity, Cambridge: South End Press, 2002; Robin 
Broad (ed.), Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2002; James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000; Jackie G. Smith and Hank Johnston (eds.), Globalization and 
Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002. 
16 Polanyi’s arguments are primarily advanced in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon, 2001. Also see Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, ‘Towards 
an Ethnological IPE: Karl Polanyi’s Double Critique of Capitalism’, Millennium—Journal of International Studies, 
Vol.28, No.2, 1999, pp.311-340. 
17 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79, by Michel Senellart (ed.), 
trans. Graham Burchell, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008; and Michel Foucault ‘The Subject and Power’, 
Critical Inquiry, Vol.8, No.4, 1982, pp.777-795. Also see: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Hoy, David Couzens, 
Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique, London: MIT Press, 2004, pp.57-100; and Brent L. 
Pickett, ‘Foucault and the Politics of Resistance’, Polity, Vol.28, No.4, 1996, pp.445-466. 
18 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990; James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, New Haven: 
18 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Yale University Press, 2009; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976; and James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 
forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 
19 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, New York: Palgrave, 2005.  
20 Scott, Weapons of the Weak (see n.18 above), pp.314-318. 
21 See, for example: Milton Friedman with Rose D. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962; and Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1960. 
22 David Keen, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008. 
23 Bruno Charbonneau, ‘War and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire: Violence, Agency and the Local/International Line’, 
International Peacekeeping, Vol.19, No.4, 2012, pp.508-524; and Meera Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in 
the Critique of the Liberal Peace’, Security Dialogue, Vol.44, No.3, 2013, pp.259-278. 
24 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, (see n.17 above). 
25 For a similar discussion of the importance of intent in resistance, see Scott, Weapons of the Weak (see n.18 
above), pp.289-303. 
26 Perhaps the most important critique of the ability to ‘speak’ for the oppressed is presented in Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988, pp.271-313. 
27 See, for example, Duffield (see n.2 above).  
28 See, for example, Ian Taylor, ‘Liberal Peace, Liberal Imperialism: A Gramscian Critique’, in Oliver Richmond 
(ed.), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010, pp. 154-174. 
29 See, for example, John Heathershaw, ‘Seeing like the International Community: How Peacebuilding Failed (and 
Survived) in Tajikistan’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.2, No.3, 2008, pp.329-351. 
30 See, for example, Vivienne Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial 
Rationality?’ Peacebuilding, Vol.1, No.1, 2013, pp.3-16. Hybridity is itself a post-colonial concept. See Homi K. 
Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994. 
31 The former understanding is best exemplified by Foucault’s work, which has had a significant impact on the field 
of post-colonial studies. See Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, by Paul 
Rabinow (ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991; Edward Said, Orientalism, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978; Robert Nichols, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of 
Problematization’, Foucault Studies, No.9, 2010, pp.111-144; and Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, (see n.17 
above). The latter understanding is more characteristic of Scott’s work. See Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance (see n.18 above). 
32 This point is made in relation to Foucault and Gramsci in Asli Daldal, ‘Power and Ideology in Michel Foucault 
and Antonio Gramsci: A Comparative Analysis’, Review of History and Political Science, Vol.2, No.2, 2014: 149-
167. 
33 Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New 
Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, Vol.24, No.1. 1998, pp.3-21; Vivienne Jabri, ‘Michel Foucault’s 
Analytics of War: The Social, the International, and the Racial’, International Political Sociology, Vol.1, No.1, 
2007, pp.67-81; Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR’, 
International Relations, Vol.21, No.3, 2007, pp.324-345; and Owen Worth, ‘The Poverty and Potential of 
Gramscian Thought in International Relations’, International Politics, Vol.45, No.6, 2008, pp.633-649. 
34 Michael C. Behrent, ‘Liberalism Without Humanism: Michel Foucault and the Free-Market Creed, 1976-1979’, 
Modern Intellectual History, Vol.6, No.3, 2009, pp.539-568. 
35 Henry Martyn Lloyd, ‘Power, Resistance, and the Foucauldian Technologies’, Philosophy Today, Vol.56, No.1, 
2012, pp.26-38 
36 Boris Divkaj and Michael Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.3, 2008, pp.373-386. 
37 Jonathan Goodhand, ‘From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in 
Afghanistan’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.58, No.1, 2004, pp.155-174. 
38 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.49, No.2, 
2011, pp.287-314. 
39 The importance of paying closer attention to the informal sphere in post-conflict environments is also emphasizes 
in Dominik Zaum, ‘Beyond the “Liberal Peace”’, Global Governance, Vol.18, No.1, 2012, pp.126-129. 
19 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
40 Francesco Strazzari and Bertine Kamphuis, ‘Hybrid Economies and Statebuilding: On the Resilience of the 
Extralegal’, Global Governance, Vol.18, No.1, 2012, pp.57-72; and Achim Wennmann, ‘Resourcing the Recurrence 
of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and their Implications for Peacebuilding’, Security Dialogue, Vol.36, 
No.4, 2005, pp.479-494. 
41 A significant body of literature exists surrounding informal economies and neoliberalism. For contrasting 
perspectives, see: Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, trans. June 
Abbott, New York: Harper & Row, 1989; and Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. Benton (eds.), The 
Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989.  
42 A brief genealogy of the economic dimensions of contemporary neoliberalism reveals three dominant strands of 
thought: classical liberalism, neoclassical economics and the so-called ‘Austrian School’. Each adheres to the 
concept, in different ways, that markets promote both individual freedoms and economic growth. For the association 
of markets with individual freedoms from, respectively, a classical liberal, a neoclassical and an ‘Austrian’ 
perspective, see: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Petersfield, 
Harriman House, 2007; Friedman and Friedman (see n.21 above); and Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (see n.21 
above). 
43 A similar point is made in Toby Dodge, ‘Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application 
of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Review of International Studies, Vol.39, No.5, 2013, pp.1189-
1212. 
44 Mac Ginty (see n.5 above), pp.117-133; and Pugh, ‘Local Agency and Political Economies of Peacebuilding’ (see 
n.7 above).   
45 This is tied to the broader failure on the part of the critical literature to adequately escape its fundamental 
(neo)liberal underpinnings. Different analyses of this problem can be found in: Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal 
Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, Vol.36, No.2, 2010, pp.337-365; and Sabaratnam (see n.23 above).  
46 While initially advanced by Polanyi (see n.14 above), this argument has been subsequently been adopted—in 
whole or in part—by authors from a variety of theoretical positions. See, for example: Ha-Joon Chang, Bad 
Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Richs Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity, London: Random House, 
2007; Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999; 
and Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown, 
New York: Verso, 2013. 
47 A similar argument about neoliberalism in non-post-conflict environments can be found in Mirowski (see n.46 
above). 
48 The argument that critical literature overemphasizes the (neo)liberal nature of contemporary peacebuilding is 
advanced in: Jan Selby ‘The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.13, No.1, 
2013, pp.57-86; and Zaum, (see n.39 above), pp.121-132. Other literature suggests that such a criticism is invalid. 
See, for example, Madhav Joshi, Sung Yong Lee and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Just How Liberal Is the Liberal Peace?’ 
International Peacekeeping, Vol.21, No.3, 2014, pp.364-389.  
49 See n.46 above. 
50 See, for example, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
51 See, for example: Carolyn Nordstrom, Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the 
Twenty-First Century, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, with Jonathan 
Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004; 
and Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (eds.), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political 
Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.   
52 Christopher Cramer, Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries, London: 
Hurst & Co., 2006. 
53 See, for example: Ludwig von Mises, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in Friedrich A. 
Hayek (ed.), Collectivist Economic Planning, London: George Routeledge and Sons, 1935, pp.87-130; Friedrich A. 
Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’, Economica, Vol.4, No.13, 1937, pp.33-54; and Friedrich A. Hayek, ‘The Use 
of Knowledge in Society’, The American Economic Review, Vol.35, No.4, 1945, pp.519-530. 
54 See, for example: Robert J. Barro, ‘Rational Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol.2, No.1, 1976, pp.1-32; and Robert E. Lucas Jr., ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of Money’, 
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.4, No.2, 1972, pp.103-124. 
20 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
55 See, for example, Eugene F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol.25, No.2, 1970, pp.383-417. 
56 Again, the economic edifice of neoliberalism involves a combination of classical liberalism, neoclassical 
economics and ‘Austrian’ economic theory. While the ‘economic calculation problem’ is primarily associated with 
the heterodox ‘Austrian School’, it has nevertheless, like many other ‘Austrian’ ideas, entered the neoclassical 
mainstream to the extent that it is seen as a foundational critique of what is regarded as state intervention in the 
market. Both rational expectations and the efficient-market hypothesis emerged from the ‘Chicago School’ of free-
market thinking, and have become two of the defining tenets of neoclassical economics since the late twentieth 
century. It is perhaps significant that some of the primary critiques of the neoliberal view of market knowledge come 
from within the neoclassical school itself. See, for example: Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Financial 
Market Imperfections and Business Cycles’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108, No.1, 1993, pp.77-114; 
Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’, The 
American Economic Review, Vol.70, No.3, 1980, pp.393-408; and Robert J. Shiller, ‘Do Stock Prices Move Too 
Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?’ The American Economic Review, Vol.71, No.3, 1981, 
pp.421-436. These views, however, do not dominate neoclassical economics, particularly the form that informs 
neoliberalism. 
57 Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) (see n.15 above); and Thomas Lemke, ‘‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel 
Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality’, Economy and Society, Vol.30, No.2, 
2001, pp.190-207. 
58 A similar criticism of Foucault is presented in Mirowski (see n.46 above), pp.89-102. 
59 See n.51 and n.52 above. 
60 Richmond (see n.4 above). 
61 See, for example: Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order and ‘Toward a Postmodern Prince’ (see 
n.11 above). 
62 Matthew D. Stephen, ‘Alter-Globalism as Counter-Hegemony: Evaluating the ‘postmodern Prince’’, 
Globalizations, Vol.6, No.4, 2009, pp.483-498; and Matthew D. Stephen, ‘Globalisation and Resistance: Struggles 
Over Common Sense in the Global Political Economy,; Review of International Studies, Vol.37, No.1, 2011, 
pp.209-228. 
63 Hoy (see n.17 above), 81-87. 
64 Polanyi (see n.16 above).  
65 Sabaratnan (see n.23 above). 
View publication stats
